Successful new products generate both trial and repeat purchases. While trial is based on expectations about product quality, repeat depends largely on satisfaction as assessed by the gap between observed and expected quality. As a consequence, companies make a tradeoff between setting expectations too high, resulting in strong trial but little repeat business, and too low, which enhances repeat business but leads to low initial trial rates. Here we focus on determining the "just right" level of advertised quality to maximize profits. The contribution of this paper is three fold. First, we explore a firm's optimal advertised quality as well as average actual quality and price. Second, we delineate conditions under which firms have an incentive to overstate quality, i.e., deceptively advertise, in an application using data from a field study involving a firm entering a new geographical market. Third, we empirically test some of our model results using data from deceptive advertising cases at the Federal Trade Commission during the period mid-1996-2002 as well as from an experiment with MBAs (future managers).
INTRODUCTION
A firm about to enter a market needs to balance two important goals: achieving initial trial and creating long-term profitability. Initial acceptance depends heavily on customer expectations about quality which are partly based on the level of quality represented in ads and other promotional communication (Goering 1985) . By contrast, continued (long-run) sales depend largely on actual quality (to the extent customers can evaluate it) and satisfaction (Cronin and Taylor 1992) . Since customer satisfaction depends on the gap between quality and expectations (Yi 1990 ) and providing quality is costly, a tension exists, from a firm's perspective, between raising expectations to increase initial acceptance/trial and lowering expectations to increase satisfaction and hence future sales.
The main contribution of this paper is three fold. First, we develop a model and explore the optimal level for advertised quality, average actual quality, and price taking into account customer satisfaction and long term market potential. The model focuses on firm decisions, using previous findings on customer behavior and satisfaction to develop the demand function the firm faces. Second, we delineate conditions under which firms have an incentive to overstate quality, i.e., advertise deceptively, an issue that is important for marketing managers and regulators alike, in a specific empirical context. Third, we examine how our model conjectures in this specific context match deceptive advertising cases at the Federal Trade Commission during 1996-2002 as well as managerial decisions made in an experiment. While in general we find support for our results and consistency between the FTC data and the experiment with managers, in one case the managerial decisions go in the opposite direction from the model implications.
Our findings suggests that although overstating quality is generally desirable, understating quality may be optimal under certain conditions -for example, when customers are more sensitive to the difference between actual and expected quality, do not discount the advertised quality (as with the case of well-known firms), have a low base level of satisfaction, and especially (and unsurprisingly) when future sales are the major source of profits. Using deceptive advertising cases at the Federal Trade Commission from mid-1996 to 2002, we find that there is more deception by a firm: (1) when the firm is unknown versus known, and (2) customers were more satisfied relative to the industry. The results of our experiment provide additional support not only for these two results but to most of the other model predictions as well.
New products come in many types including really new products which create markets (a rare event), modest product changes, and entry to existing markets which are new to the company (i.e., across countries). In all these cases, customers are uncertain about product quality. In introducing such products, a firm needs to set expectations for quality (generally via advertising) as well as decide on actual quality and price. In our empirical analysis, we examine these decisions in the context of a product entering a new market where competitors quality and pricing levels are already established. The product is new in the sense that (i) it was not available previously in the market and (ii) its quality can be set specific to the new market, i.e., the technology is a decision variable.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief discussion of relevant literature. We then present our model. Next, we estimate several model parameters using data from a field study. We then determine the optimal levels of advertised quality, average actual quality, and price from a firm's perspective via numerical analysis. Empirical analysis involving both FTC data and an experiment are then presented. Finally, we discuss our findings and suggestions for future research.
BACKGROUND
Advertising plays multiple roles (for example, as a signal of quality, to provide information, as a barrier to entry etc.). Focusing on the information providing role, a key aspect involves setting quality expectations. Quality expectations influence both initial purchases and, through their role in determining satisfaction, repeat/subsequent purchases. Further, while high initial expectations may lead to initial purchase, inflated expectations lead to dissatisfaction and hence decreased future purchases. Consequently the management of expectations both pre-and post-purchase is a key component of marketing strategy. In this paper, we focus on the use of advertising to set optimal customer quality expectations.
Of course, advertising does not always accurately convey product quality (Jacoby and Szybillo 1995; Johar 1995; Richards 1990) . One might expect the largest gap between average advertised and actual quality when quality is difficult to observe (Darby and Karni 1973) , such as the health and nutritional benefits of certain foods (Greenberg 1996; Pappalardo 1996) .
Typical analysis assumes that all companies have an incentive to stretch unverifiable claims within the boundaries of the law (Crawford and Sobel 1982; Farrell and Gibbons 1989) . Even advertisements for products whose quality can be both observed and measured tend to exaggerate claims. For example, ski resorts routinely overstate the quality of their skiable terrain (The Wall Street Journal, December 22, 1992) , just as food producers embellish claims of product freshness. Nestle S.A.'s Contadina Fresh refrigerated pasta sauce and Procter & Gamble Co.'s Citrus Hill Fresh Choice orange juice both conveyed the quality of "freshness" in their packaging. When the two companies removed the word "Fresh" from these products' labels (Wall Street Journal, May 8, 1991) , they in effect admitted that they had over-represented product quality. Nagler (1993) suggests that companies will advertise deceptively when consumers are boundedly rational, i.e., when full rationality entails a cost to the consumers. This, however, does not explain why some companies deliberately under-represent the quality of their products or services. Although it is more difficult to find examples of this, one was Boeing, whose "sales force ... tend to understate rather than overstate product benefits" (Kotler and Armstrong 1987) .
Small firms such as Ben & Jerry's, gained consumers' trust and respect with their modest claims (Advertising Age, December 5, 1994) . Similarly, some restaurants exaggerate the amount of time patrons are told they must wait for a table, and other companies overstate their advertised delivery time. Toyota's understatement of quality in its introduction of Lexus is another example. The objective of underplaying quality is to lead consumers to expect less and then pleasantly surprise them when their expectations are exceeded.
Whether under-or over-representing, each of the above companies promoted a level of quality that differed from their products' actual quality. Here we examine the conditions under which a firm should overstate or understate quality. This involves considering the effects of actual and advertised quality on consumer expectations and satisfaction, and the ensuing impact on demand and profit. Akin to Bloomfield and Kadiyali (2000) and Kopalle and Assunção (2000) , we assume advertised claims of quality (unlike advertised prices) do not need to be completely accurate and do not result in additional out-of-pocket costs (as long as the misstatement is not so large as to incur legal liability). This paper focuses on three marketing-mix variables: the advertised level of product quality, average actual quality, and the price charged. A firm that exaggerates its quality and has high initial sales faces the problem of lower subsequent sales when consumers learn that the product has not lived up to their expectations. Alternatively, a firm could understate its quality (and thus have lower sales initially) but build a base of satisfied customers who would subsequently repeat.
A MODEL OF CONSUMER AND FIRM BEHAVIOR
This section develops a model for the impact of advertised quality on profits, relying on results established in the choice modeling, advertising, and satisfaction areas. Our model applies to experience goods (Darby and Karni 1973) -products that must be used in order for their quality to be observed. Typically, for such products realized (actual) quality varies across customers and over time due to chance variation in quality (see Wadsworth, Stephens, and Godfrey 1986) as well as customer heterogeneity and environmental characteristics. For example, durability of car tires depends on customer driving habits, driving conditions, etc.
(Consumers ' Research 1991) . Similarly, customer service time differs across customers and over time (Kumar, Kalwani, and Dada 1997) . Thus, we conceptualize actual quality, Q, as following a distribution, f(Q) with mean, µ, and variance σ 2 . In other words, the actual quality experienced by a given customer in a given period is a random draw from this distribution.
The focus of this paper is on the firm setting customers' quality expectations taking into consideration their impact on trial, satisfaction and subsequent purchase. We allow three forms of customer heterogeneity. First is the heterogeneity in experienced quality as described above.
The second and third, described in the next sub-section, are heterogeneity in customer expectations and heterogeneity in customers' sensitivity to the gap between expected quality and experienced quality.
We consider a two-period model. When consumers purchase the product in Period 1, they do so based on the information provided by the firm and upon general information sources that suggest the average actual quality of the product. Customers then update their expectations about the product's quality based upon their experience with the product and make a decision whether to purchase in the second period (and by implication subsequent periods).
While our model does not explicitly consider competitive actions, their impact appears implicitly in many of the model parameters (for example, price sensitivity). Our analysis of firm behavior is akin to a monopolistic competition framework (Shleifer 1986; Shleifer and Vishny 1988) . This is a reasonable assumption for a follower in a multiple firm industry (such as car tires) where the other firms have already chosen their respective marketing mix strategies. As suggested by Shugan (2002) , monopolistic characterizations are often useful. The context we consider is that of firm introducing a product in a market new to the firm. The impact of strategic thinking by other firms that led to choices of their own optimal quality, advertised quality, and price levels are contained in the parameters of the demand equation. In effect this could be construed as a game where the firm under consideration is the follower and initial positions are "sticky", i.e., the established market is set and does not react to the new entrant, which is typical for large existing companies faced with a new, and at least initially small, competitor. These companies have stickiness due to their established procedures (e.g., regarding price and quality) and a tendency to initially ignore small entrants (e.g., Christensen 1997) . For a paper that focuses on competition in the context of service delivery time, but does not consider the dynamics of expectation formation or advertised quality or price, see Ho and Zheng (2004) .
Consumer Behavior
Expectations in Period 1: Information provided by advertisements partially determines expectations (Boulding, Kalra, Staelin, and Zeithaml 1993; Kopalle and Lehmann 1995; Oliver and Winer 1987; van Raaij 1991) . We assume information about the firm's average actual quality is also available through websites, testing firms, firm reputation etc. Thus, following Boulding et al. (1993) and Boulding, Kalra, and Staelin (1999) , customer i's "will" expectation about the quality of a product at the beginning of Period 1 ( ), which is operationalized as "how long customers expect a product to last", is:
where I is the information provided by the firm about the quality of the product, i.e., the advertised level of quality; µ is the average actual product quality and 0 ≤ α ι1 < 1 represents the portion of the expectation due to advertising. Note that advertised quality (I), average actual quality (µ), and price (P) are firm level decision variables and therefore are not heterogeneous across customers. We capture customer heterogeneity in quality expectations in Period 1 via the weight customers place on advertised quality in forming their expectations, i.e., α ι1 for individual i is a draw from a distribution g(α 1 ) (independent of f) with mean 1 α and variance
Demand in Period 1: We use a binary logit specification for the purchase probability of individual i in Period 1 where the purchase probability is a function of customer expectations (Krishna 1992) , i.e., expected quality ( ) and price, P. Thus, the utility of individual i is:
where V i1 is the deterministic component of individual i's utility in Period 1, i.e., The average demand in period 1, 1 D is the average purchase probability across all customers, i.e.,
Satisfaction: Disconfirmation (i.e., performance-minus-expectations) significantly affects satisfaction (Boulding et al. 1993; Oliver 1997; Bolton and Drew 1991; Spreng, MacKenzie, and Olshavsky 1996) . Although there has been some debate about its exact impact on service quality (Cronin and Taylor 1992, 1994; Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1994; Teas 1993) , it clearly has a significant effect on satisfaction (Bolton and Drew 1991; Bolton and Lemon 1999; Spreng, MacKenzie, and Olshavsky 1996) . According to the disconfirmation or gap model, satisfaction at time t is a function of the difference between realized product quality at time t, and prior expectations about the product's quality at t-1. Kopalle and Lehmann (2001) focus on how customers set their expectations and on disconfirmation sensitivity as an individual trait. Disconfirmation sensitive consumers are the simpler and widely accepted, "will expectation" formulation in this paper.
defined as those who are more satisfied (or dissatisfied) when products perform better (worse) than expected. They show that for consumers whose self-rated disconfirmation sensitivity was higher, the impact of disconfirmation on satisfaction was in fact greater. Therefore, we incorporate an interaction effect of disconfirmation sensitivity and performance minus expectations on satisfaction in the demand function for the product under consideration. We allow disconfirmation sensitivity (DS) to vary across individuals, i.e., disconfirmation sensitivity of individual i, DS i , is a draw from a distribution h (independent of f and g) with mean DS and variance . Boulding et al. (1999) , Bolton and Drew (1991) , Bolton and Lemon (1999) , Oliver (1997) , Spreng et al. (1996) , and Yi (1990) , we include the direct effect of actual quality on customer satisfaction. Further, we include a non-linear (diminishing returns) impact of the gap between actual quality and expectations on satisfaction (Anderson and Sullivan 1993; Kopalle and Lehmann 2001; Mittal, Ross, and Baldasare 1998) . Finally, as discussed earlier, realized quality in Period 1, Q 1 , is heterogeneous across customers, thus capturing the notion that the quality of the experienced good may be different for different customers. The realized satisfaction of customer i at the end of period 1 (S i1 ) is given by: Expectations in Period 2: Customers update expectations based on past expectations and the actual quality realized in Period 1 (Boulding et al. 1999; Johnson, Anderson, and Fornell 1995; Rust, Inman, Jia, and Zahorik 1999) . Accordingly, if customer i bought the product in Period 1, expectations of that customer in Period 2 are given by:
where 0 ≤ α 2 < 1 determines the weight given to prior expectations in the updating process.
Since expectations in Period 1 as well as experienced quality in Period 1 vary across customers, the expected quality in Period 2 also varies across customers. To keep the model tractable, we assume α 2 is constant across customers. If a customer i does not buy the product in period 1, we assume expectations are unchanged, i.e., .
Demand in Period 2: In Period 2, the utility of customer i is given by U i2 = V i2 + e i2 . If the customer bought the product in Period 1, the deterministic component of utility for customer i, V i2 , consists of two components. Similar to V i1 in Period 1, the first component is due to price and expected quality, which we term the "normal effect." The second component is the satisfaction component, i.e., the utility in Period 2 increases with the amount of satisfaction derived in Period 1 (Shiv and Huber 2000) , consistent with Mittal and Kamakura (2001) who find a significant link between satisfaction and repurchase intent, and between repurchase intent and repurchase behavior. Hence, the satisfaction given by Equation (6) impacts the probability of purchase in Period 2. If customer i buys the product in Period 1, , the purchase probability in Period 2 conditional on Period 1's purchase is given by the following binary logit model, where satisfaction in Period 1, S i1 , is given by Equation (6), and b 3 captures the impact of satisfaction on purchase.
If customer i does not buy the product in Period 1, the deterministic component of the utility remains unchanged from Period 1, i.e., V i2|no buy = V i1 (Equation 3). However, the error component in Period 2, e i2 , would be different from e i1 . Hence, it is possible that an individual who has not bought the product in Period 1 may have a different level of utility in Period 2.
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At the beginning of Period 1, the ex-ante probability of purchase in Period 2 for a customer i is:
where is the purchase probability in Period 1. Substituting Equations (4) and (8) 
where S i1 is given by Equation (6).
) lies between 0 and 1. Since realized quality, Q 1 , is a random variable, we integrate over its distribution to arrive at the expected purchase probability in Period 2 for
] is derived by integrating Equation (9b) over Q 1 . That is,
The average purchase probability across all customers in Period 2, 2 D , is given by integrating
Thus, in our model we incorporate customer level heterogeneity in 2 D in several ways. First, we allow quality expectations in Period 1 to vary across customers through the weight each customer places on the information provided by the firm via a distribution g. Second, we allow 2 Since purchase is probabilistic, actual behavior can change even if the purchase probability does not.
the experienced quality of the product in Period 1, Q 1 , to vary across customers according to a probability distribution f. Note that each of the above two mechanisms cause quality expectations to vary across customers in Period 2 as does the error component of the utility function. We also allow disconfirmation sensitivity, DS, to be customer specific and distributed h (independent of f and g).
Firm Behavior
Consider a firm entering a market new to the company whose objective is to maximize net discounted profit by setting advertised quality, I, average actual quality, µ, and price, P. We develop a two-period model which incorporates the trade-off between the benefits of immediate sales (from trials), which suggest setting the advertised quality, I, to maximize initial expectations, and future sales (from trials and repeat purchases), which are greater among first period purchasers who have lower initial expectations.
By allowing the impact of second period sales to be greater through the use of a multiple (m), the model captures the relatively greater importance of subsequent period sales. For example, since initial sales are often at a trial level, subsequent per period purchases are often greater in magnitude than initial ones. The multiplier m represents the discounted value of future earnings from a customer due to repeat purchases from Period 2 forward as a multiplier of that period's revenue (Gupta and Lehmann 2003; Gupta, Lehmann, and Stuart 2004) . 3 Thus, the objective function for the firm is,
where the purchase probabilities in Periods 1 and 2, 1 D and 2 D , are given by Equations (5) 3 Notice that if the average demand stabilizes in Periods 2 through k (and then drops to zero), the average profit across customers from Periods 2 through k becomes
where v is variable cost and r is the discount rate. Therefore m would be Based on Kopalle and Winer (1996) , Lehmann-Grube (1997) , and Rosenkranz (1997) , we assume that changes in quality levels impact the fixed cost, F, as in cases where investments in new machinery or facilities or R&D are required for quality improvements. The tire industry is a good example of where R&D investments are necessary for quality enhancements (for example, see Harvard Business School Case 9-594-106, 1994). We consider the following convex relationship between fixed cost, F, and the average actual quality:
For k > 0, Equation (13) has increasing marginal cost of quality, similar to the functional form used by Schmalensee (1978) and fulfills the criteria for a cost function in Rogerson (1988) . We also allowed for variable cost to depend linearly on quality, i.e., v=a+bµ. The nature of our results remain unchanged so we present only results based on Equations (12) and (13).
To determine optimal advertised quality, average quality, and price, in principle we could substitute Equations (1), (5), (7), (11), and (13) into the profit Equation (12), and simultaneously solve the first order conditions with respect to advertised quality, I, average quality, µ, and price, P. Given the complexity of the general model, there is no closed form solution for I * , µ * , and P * (the optimal advertised quality, average actual quality, and price respectively). Therefore, in the next section, we describe an empirical application of our model and develop the results.
Appendix 1 shows analytical results from a special case which uses linear probability of choice and satisfaction specifications and where actual quality and price are given.
AN APPLICATION AND RESULTS
Instead of choosing arbitrary parameter values, we estimated a base case set of parameters using data from Kopalle and Lehmann (2001) which focus on a tire purchasing scenario.
Although the study participants were told that the brand, CAMAC, had been in the tire business for over fifty years, almost all (99%) the study participants indicated that they had not heard of that brand before participating in the study. This means that the product was new to respondents.
(Actually, CAMAC had been in the tire business in Europe but has not been introduced in the United States.) Based on the estimated parameters, we determined the optimal solution numerically for some base cases. We then conduct simulations, i.e., comparative statics, which vary model parameters to arrive at our results. We also varied the various model parameters (+/-50%) to test the robustness of our results.
We also used two additional sets of base case parameters based on Kopalle and Lehmann (2001) : one follows their Table 1 and another incorporates the concept of "as if" expectations. In both these analyses, we again varied the parameter values +/-50% and developed the results.
Since in all analyses the model results continued to hold, here we focus on the case where we use Kopalle and Lehmann's (2001) Study 2 to estimate a base case set of parameters.
Data and Measures. The data consists of customer expectations, satisfaction, and purchase intention measures about car tires from 200 mall intercept respondents, along with their respective disconfirmation sensitivities. Car tires are a relatively high involvement durable good for consumers in a mall intercept study, and tread life is a good measure of product quality (Consumers' Research 1991). In the study, subjects were told they were driving and encountered a road hazard which made it necessary to get new tires. At the service station they found, the only brand of tires in their size was a brand they had not heard of which the store recommended (see Kopalle and Lehmann 2001 for details). Actual quality was manipulated between respondents at five levels (20,000, 30,000, 40,000, 50,000, and 60,000 miles). Both prior and updated (after observing the quality of the product, which was revealed in the experimental setting) expectations were measured in miles.
Results. Average disconfirmation sensitivity, DS , was 5.5 on a seven-point scale with a variance of 0.53. Note that Equation (7) may be rewritten as:
The impact of the difference between experienced quality and prior expectations on change in expectations is:
Thus, α 2 = 0.30 which means respondents update their expectations fairly quickly.
[Insert Table 1 About Here]
Satisfaction in Period 1 ( Equation 6) is determined by actual quality in Period 1, disconfirmation, disconfirmation squared, and disconfirmation sensitivity (Table 1) .
Disconfirmation sensitivity, as expected, has no significant direct effect on satisfaction and therefore, we drop it from the satisfaction equation. 4 Disconfirmation sensitivity does have a significant impact on satisfaction through an interaction with disconfirmation. The quadratic disconfirmation term is negative and significant, suggesting a diminishing returns effect of disconfirmation on satisfaction. Comparing the reduced model results in Table 1 with Equation Finally, we examine the impact of satisfaction on purchase behavior in Period 2. Since the data consists of stated purchase intentions in Period 2 which tend to over predict actual buying behavior, we first converted the stated purchase intentions (on a 7-point scale) to estimate 4 The disconfirmation sensitivity variable is mean centered to reduce collinearity between the gap, Q-, and the interaction (DS)(Q-E 1 ). (Table   2 ) suggest that while both updated expectations and satisfaction determine purchase probability, the impact of satisfaction is much stronger (d s = 0.66 > b 1 = 0.10). In other words, the subjective reaction to past purchase dominates the impact of updated expectations.
[Insert Table 2 About Here]
Optimal Advertised Quality, Average Actual Quality, and Price
We use the estimated parameters to determine optimal advertised and actual quality and price in an analysis of a base-case scenario and then develop comparative statics. In the numerical analysis, we set b 0 = 1 and b 2 = -1 since we could not uniquely estimate these parameters based on the available data and then determine the optimal levels of advertised and average actual quality, and price. The implied price elasticity is around -1.70 in the first period and -1.63 in the second, within the range reported in Tellis (1988) and close to the average price elasticity of about -1.76 (Tellis 1988) . This suggests the choice of b 2 = -1 is reasonable. Importantly, varying b 0 and b 2 did not change the qualitative nature of our results, i.e, the model results still hold.
We consider two types of distributions for f(Q 1 ), g(α 1 ), and h(DS): one is uniform with respective means µ (a decision variable), 1 α =0.5, and DS =5.5. We vary both 1 α and DS to examine the impact of these parameters on the optimal solution. In Kopalle and Lehmann's (2001) , the range for actual quality, Q 1 , was 20,000 to 60,000 and disconfirmation sensitivity ranged from 4 to 7 on a 7-point scale. We used the same ranges in this paper. Since we varied 1 α 5 In the study, all respondents bought the product in Period 1.
(which lies between 0 and 1) from 0.2 to 0.8, the range was set at +/-0.2 around 1 α to keep all values between 0 and 1. The second distribution used for f, g, and h, was the normal with the same mean values as in the uniform case. Since actual quality, Q 1 , ranged from 20,000 to 60,000, σ for an equivalent normal distribution is approximately given by 40,000/6. Since α 1 spans 0 to 1, the corresponding approximate standard deviation for the normal distribution is 1/6. Similarly, the standard deviation for the disconfirmation sensitivity distribution was set at 3/6. Without loss of generality, we consider a single customer segment buying four tires (y = 4), with a multiplier effect of m = 3. Our choice of the multiplier effect is consistent with Gupta and Lehmann's (2003) analysis who suggest the customer life-time value is often about four times the current (initial) period value.
While we report the results of the uniform distribution in this paper, we obtain very similar results with the normal distribution. Further, our results were also robust to variations in the two cost parameters, v and k, which were varied around the base case values of 1.0 and 0.1. Thus, using the parameter values described above, the optimal levels of average actual quality, advertised quality, and price were 3.75 units, 4.5 units, and 2.5 units respectively. In other words, for the base case, the corresponding optimal average actual and advertised quality are 37,500 miles and 45,000 miles respectively, implying about 20% overstatement of quality. Table 3 describes the effect of the multiplier, m, and advertised quality, I, on purchase probabilities in Periods 1 and 2 and the total profit in both periods (average quality and price were set at their respective optimal levels).
[Insert Table 3 About Here]
Initial sales increase as advertised quality increases. Further, when the second period sales "count" the same as first period sales, profits are greater when advertised quality exceeds average actual quality. However, when future period sales are more important (m = 3), profit begins to decrease when advertised quality exceeds its optimal level.
Results
We examined how optimal levels of the variables of interest change when the parameters of the model, especially those related to customer characteristics, change. One interesting variable
is the "quality claim differential," the difference between advertised and average actual quality; a positive (negative) level indicates overstatement (understatement). In order to develop general results, we varied the following five model parameters: average disconfirmation sensitivity ( DS ) from 1 to 7 in steps of 1, the weight consumers place on advertised quality (α 1 ) from 0.2 to 0.8 in steps of .1, the value of future purchases (m) from 1 to 7 in steps of 1, the base level of customer satisfaction with the firm (d 0 ) from 1 to 7 in steps of 1, and the weight customers place on prior expectations in updating their expectations (α 2 ) from 0.1 to 0.9 in steps of 0.1.
The first set of results largely reflect model assumptions, essentially playing the role of manipulation checks in experimental research:
Result 1: As disconfirmation sensitivity, DS , increases, optimal quality claim differential decreases.
As disconfirmation sensitivity increases, customers will be more satisfied for a given level of realized and expected quality. Firms can enhance satisfaction, and therefore increase sales in Period 2, by lowering advertised quality and thereby lowering expectations. Hence, the optimal quality claim differential decreases as disconfirmation sensitivity increases, exactly as expected.
Result 2: When potential future sales (i.e., multiplier, m) from a customer increases, optimal quality claim differential decreases.
As the relative value of future income from a customer increases, it becomes more important for the firm to increase the likelihood that a customer will buy its product in Period 2. One way to increase this likelihood is to increase satisfaction in Period 1 by lowering the level of advertised quality. Thus, unsurprisingly, it is optimal for the firm to understate quality when future potential is high because the benefits of future sales resulting from satisfied customers outweigh the advantage of higher initial sales.
Result 3:
As the weight customers place on prior expectations(α 2 ) increases, the optimal quality claim differential increases.
If customers are slow to update expectations, there is incentive to create higher (false) initial expectations. The negative effect of disconfirmed expectations on Period 2's purchase probability is offset by the positive effect of the still high expectations on the corresponding purchase probability.
The next two results were not as obvious a priori.
Result 4:
As the weight customers place on advertised quality (α 1 ) increases, the optimal quality claim differential decreases.
At the outset, one might expect the more effective advertising is, the more the firm should overstate quality. Following Equation (1), as customers place more weight on the advertised information provided by the firm (as is the case with firms that are well known), customer expectations increase with advertised quality. However, ceteris paribus, higher expectations lead to lower satisfaction in Period 1, thus lowering future revenue. It is in the best interest for a firm to enhance Period 2's purchase probability without unduly sacrificing Period 1's likelihood of purchase (because Period 2's probability is conditioned on purchase in Period 1). Thus, when customers do not discount what firms say about the quality of their products and use it more in evaluating the products for purchase decisions, firms have less incentive to overstate quality. For example, the advertising of well-known firms, at least those with positive brand equity, tends to be more effective, i.e., customers place more weight on their ads, so customers discount the claims of a well-known brand less (Goldberg and Hartwick 1990) . Result 4 suggests that in such instances there is less need to "hype" quality. Hence, such firms are able to manage customer expectations in such a way that future purchase probability is enhanced without overly sacrificing sales in the first period. By contrast, since customers are more likely to place less emphasis on advertised quality in the case of unknown firms, such firms, in an effort to increase customer expectations (and therefore sales in Period 1), should advertise higher quality and thus increase the overstatement of quality. Of course, a well-known brand has more at risk in terms of possible damage to its other products as well, providing another (not modeled) reason to not overstate quality.
Result 5:
As the base level of satisfaction with a firm's product (d 0 ) increases, the optimal quality claim differential increases.
Again, at the outset, one might expect that as customer satisfaction increases, firms should not overstate quality and jeopardize the higher satisfaction levels. However, note that when customers' base level of satisfaction is higher, they are more satisfied with a firm's product regardless of quality; this, in turn, decreases the relative impact of disconfirmation sensitivity on satisfaction in Period 1 and consequently on Period 2's purchase probability. Hence, the firm can be more concerned with increasing sales in Period 1, which can be achieved by increasing optimal advertised quality, which leads to increasing the quality claim differential. In other words, if customers are going to be satisfied with a firm's product regardless of quality, such firms have an incentive to overstate quality. Mercedes' introduction of ML320 (where the firm appears to have overstated its quality) is a good example in this context.
Additional Analysis
In many situations a manager may not have control over quality. To assess the impact of this,
as an additional analysis we investigated the special case where average quality is predetermined. In this situation, as the average quality level increases, the percent gap between advertised and average quality decreases. This suggests that firms with higher quality can obtain an optimal level of initial expectations by relying more on the market's information (as driven by 1-α 1 ) rather than overstatement (which has negative consequences in Period 2). In other words, there is a "virtuous" reward to high technical quality. For example, high quality firms such as Vanguard, GE, and Marriott tend not to overstate their quality. Combining this result with Result 5, it is interesting to note that firms need to balance the main effect of high quality versus that of a high base level of satisfaction on the quality claim differential.
EMPIRICAL SUPPORT
In this section, we examine whether some of the model implications are consistent with observed behavior. We do so via two methods. One is using data from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on deceptive advertising practices. The second is a study with MBA students (i.e., soon to be managers) from a top business school. Below, we describe the results of the two studies in more detail.
FTC Study
Based on the model, Results 4 and 5 made predictions about the types of companies that would be most likely to overstate quality. To get a sense of whether reflects reality, we collected data on deceptive advertising cases brought to trial by the Federal Trade Commission in the United States from mid-1996 to December 2002. Cases since August 1996 are archived at www.ftc.gov. There were a total of 745 deceptive advertising cases of which 627 were found guilty as charged by the FTC and 117 were still under trial; there was only one case that was found not guilty. 6 Since this data do not closely match the model and is non-specific in many cases about how new the products involved were, this analysis should be viewed as potentially interesting and indicative but far from a tight test. Still, unless "real world" results are generally consistent, there would be serious concerns about the model's validity.
The FTC classifies the severity of deceptive advertising into four categories: (1) Misrepresentation, for example, a company could promise consumers awards if they purchased their product, but the awards received were worth significantly less than represented. (2) Unsubstantiated claim, for example, advertising a dietary supplement as a purported cellulite treatment without substantiating the claim, (3) False claim, where a company claims it has evidence establishing their product's efficacy but no such evidence exists, and (4) Scam, which is fraudulent activity that is intentionally devised to cheat consumers. Thirty six percent of the cases were misrepresentations while 12%, 13%, and 39% fell in the other three categories respectively. To get an index of deception, we coded misrepresentation as the mildest form of deceptive advertising, followed by unsubstantiated claims, false claims, and scam, the most severe form of deceptive advertising.
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In order to assess the reputation of the companies in each of the above 627 cases, we searched five databases that provide company level information: Global Business Browser, Lexis-Nexis, Dun &Bradstreet Million Dollar Database, RDS Table Database, and Thomson Research. Although these databases cover thousands of companies, only 25% of the 627 FTC cases were included in the databases. No company information was available for the rest of the cases. Therefore, we coded "company reputation" as a dummy variable where 1 indicates whether the company was known, i.e., mentioned in one of the five databases. If the company was not mentioned in the databases, it was coded as unknown (0). Second, of the "known"
companies, for 41 of the cases, we were able to obtain company satisfaction relative to industry satisfaction using the American Consumer Satisfaction Index made available at the website, www.theacsi.org/industry_scores.htm, by the National Quality Research Center at the University of Michigan Business School. The satisfaction measures we used were for the year preceding the FTC charge.
Result 4 suggests that when customers do not discount advertised quality, as should be the case for better known firms, a firm has less incentive to indulge in overstatement of quality. This appears to be the case. 468 of the 627 cases were against unknown firms, far greater than their percent of gross domestic product. Interestingly, the severity of the FTC charge (which reflects to some degree the extent of over-statement of quality) was also negatively correlated with whether the firm was known or not (r = -.36, p < .0001, with means of 1.74 and 2.84 respectively for known and unknown firms).
As suggested by Result 5, when customers are generally more satisfied with a firm, i.e., as customers' base level of satisfaction with a firm increases, the firm has more incentive to overstate quality. Among the known companies in the FTC cases, as expected, the company's base level of satisfaction (measured as company satisfaction relative to industry satisfaction) was positively correlated with overstating quality (r = 0.44, p < .005). 8 Thus, the pattern of actual firm behavior provides some support for the two model implications.
MBA Study
A potentially interesting question is whether managers behave in accordance with the normative model implications. To address this, we conducted a survey of MBA students. These future managers had all completed the core marketing course. In addition, they had on average, four years of work experience, including 1.7 years of work in sales and marketing, and were about 28 years old. Thus, the subjects should be a reasonable proxy for working managers. They were contacted via email and were entered in a lottery with one $500 and five $100 prizes as an incentive to participate.
The study introduction described their task as deciding on the level of mileage to advertise for their company's new line of tires. They were told their testing showed the tires would last between 28,000 and 52,000 miles depending on driving patterns and road conditions. Subjects were told that satisfaction and repeat purchase depend significantly on the difference between expected and realized tire life. The 235 MBA's who were emailed the survey then were given 8 scenarios representing an orthogonal design of the following five binary factors (see Table 4 and [Insert Table 4 About Here]
The order of scenarios was rotated across subjects in a Latin Square design. Notice that the first variable (Brand) and the last (customers' satisfaction level) are the same used in the FTC data analysis to test Results 4 and 5 respectively, and that the objective and updating variables related to specific model predictions (Results 2 and 3 respectively). The third factor (reliance on company ads versus independent quality ratings) represents an alternative way to test Result 4.
Disconfirmation sensitivity is a relatively abstract concept. Therefore, we chose not to test its impact on advertising claims (Result 1) to keep the study as simple as possible.
In all, 111 students completed the study, a response rate of 47.2%. The average mileage claim for the eight scenarios used is shown in Table 5 . From this, a few observations are warranted. First, the general tendency was to advertise slightly above the mid-point of the actual mileage range, i.e., to "overstate" since 42,656 is significantly above 40,000 (by 6.6%). Second, as expected, respondents overstated quality the most (48,860) in Scenario 1 where the brand was not well known, the objective was short run, and customers rely on ads, change expectations slowly, and are generally satisfied. By contrast, they actually understated quality (37,278 versus 40,000) for Scenario 8: a well known brand with a long-run objective facing customers who rely on ads, change expectations substantially, and are generally not satisfied. Encouragingly, clearly false claims were rarely utilized-only 1% of the 880 observations were outside the 28,000 to 52,000 range, and the averages all fall within the tested range of 28,000 to 52,000..
To more formally test the model results, we ran a regression where the quality claim differential (mileage claim in thousands of miles minus 40, the average actual quality) was the dependent variables. The independent variables were the five study variables. Since we have multiple (eight) observations from each respondent, we take into consideration individual specific effects using the following random effects regression model ( τ According to Results 4 and 5 and based on the FTC study, we expect α 1 < 0 and α 5 < 0 in Equation (17). Results 2 and 3 respectively suggest that α 2 < 0 and α 4 < 0. Result 4 would also imply that α 3 < 0. We test model significance by constructing a null model which only has an intercept and the respondent specific effects; the corresponding log-likelihood test (chi-square test, Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, p. 58) shows that the two full models perform significantly better than the corresponding null models. The results are given in Table 5 . Equivalent results are obtained from OLS regression which includes the five factor dummies and either 110 dummies for the 111 participants or include a variable which is the subject's mean response across the eight scenarios.
[Insert Table 5 About Here]
Most of the results were consistent with the model. First, as expected, respondents advertised lower quality (tire life) when they had a well-known brand or when the customers were not satisfied with the tires they buy, consistent with Results 4 and 5 as well with the results of the FTC study. Interestingly, the "future managers" made higher quality claims when they believed customers would, in general, be satisfied, consistent with the model predictions. The respondents also advertised lower quality when they expected consumers would update their expectations substantially (e.g., for a very experiential good) or when they were concerned primarily about long-run sales, as expected in Results 2 and 3.
One result contradicted model predictions. Subjects made lower mileage claims when they believed consumers relied more heavily on independent quality ratings such as consumer reports vis-à-vis ads. This suggests they would make high ad claims only when they thought such ads were effective in shaping customer expectations. When customers largely ignore ad claims, while we expected a "why not" attitude to making high claims (i.e., because they expect consumers to discount the ad claims), a "why bother" response appears to be stronger.
DISCUSSION
A firm's decisions with respect to quality, price, and in particular advertised quality (which may differ from average actual quality) are critical for the long-run success of a new product.
Here we modeled the impact of advertised quality on initial and subsequent sales incorporating consumer expectations and satisfaction. A fairly complex (and hopefully realistic) model was developed, a set of base parameters estimated based on a field study, and its propositions examined via numerical methods. Several results emerge. In the "obvious" category, the optimal difference between advertised quality and average quality decreases when customers are more sensitive to the difference between advertised and experienced quality, potential future earnings from customers increase, and when customers place less weight on prior expectations (i.e., place more weight on actual experience). Somewhat less obvious, optimal overstatement of quality decreases when customers (i) place more weight on advertised quality, and (ii) the base level of satisfaction with a firm decreases. Note that we employed three very different methods which produced similar results, thus giving us confidence that the results are not an artifact of any of the three methods, i.e., (1) the data used to estimate model parameters were "forced choice" of a product new to the customers; we used this to get a base set of parameters. We then varied these parameters in subsequent simulations. (2) FTC data where firms advertised at such a level as to lead to a complaint which the FTC chose to hear, and (3) A survey of what quality level managers would advertise a given in multiple scenarios.
In summary, our model results suggest that when customers accept a company's "word" (i.e., believe its claims), overstatement of quality should be reduced. This suggests that wellestablished, high-quality companies have less incentive to overstate quality. However, when customers are generally satisfied (e.g., in the case of brand extensions or ego-expressive products), there is more reason to overstate quality. These results were consistent with our analysis of deceptive advertising cases at the FTC. Both (1) unknown companies and (2) companies whose customers' are generally more satisfied (relative to industry satisfaction) seem to indulge in more deceptive advertising. Thus, while Sauer and Leffler's (1990) evidence suggests that adoption of FTC advertising substantiation program increased the credibility of advertising, firms have incentives to overstate quality.
It is also interesting that all but one of the four model results tested were directionally consistent with the tendencies of soon-to-be managers. The one exception was that managers would not "bother" to advertise high quality if they thought consumers would not weight ads heavily whereas the model indicates it would be optimal to do so. This suggests that managerial instinct is not always optimal and that model prescriptions should at least be considered in making decisions.
Of course, the results reported here depend on both the model and the data. Generalization to other datasets and product categories is clearly desirable. One may also investigate other model forms, in particular a dynamic infinite horizon model as well as equilibrium properties under strategic competition. Further, while we include heterogeneity in terms of the weight customers place on advertised quality, variation in actual quality, and disconfirmation sensitivity, it would be helpful to also study other forms of customer heterogeneity.
Other extensions could also deal with a number of interesting aspects such as: (i) the impact of warranties, (ii) explicit feedback effects to the brand's other products (which would tend to decrease the overstatement of quality), (iii) discounting of claims by customers before combining them with quality ratings (which could actually increase overstatement), (iv) allowing the firm to use other methods (e.g., promotions) to induce trial, (v) allowing disconfirmation sensitivity to influence perceived quality, and (vi) allowing for learning by customers who do not purchase in Period 1 based on the experience of those who do.
Still the results here are encouraging. As an example of the implications, the following suggests some categories may be more prone to quality overstatement.
Five Questions to Help Determine When Overstatement of Quality Will be Greater
When One other interesting implication also emerges from our modeling effort. The results suggest that decisions about price, quality, and advertising need to be integrated. Yet in practice these decisions are often made by different organizational units and individuals. These results clearly imply that making decisions separately for the various elements of the marketing mix is likely to be noticeably less than optimal. Hopefully future research and practice will incorporate the more integrative perspective. 
Probability of purchase for a customer: 
The average purchase probability across all customers in Period 2, 2 D , is given by,
Optimal Advertised Quality
Taking the derivative with respect to the advertised quality, I, in the above objective equation, setting it to zero, rearranging the terms, and simplifying, we get, optimal advertised quality 
Proof:
Taking the partial derivative of Equation (13) , and DS are greater than zero, and α 2 < 1, the derivative is negative.
Proposition 3:
The optimal quality claim differential increases with α 2 , the weight customers place on prior expectations in forming their updated expectations.
Proof:
Taking the partial derivative of Equation (13) 
Taking the partial derivative of Equation (13) This condition is satisfied either when the average disconfirmation sensitivity is low or when the quality sensitivity is high, or both. In a field study of car tires ( §4), we find that this condition is indeed satisfied.
Proposition 5:
As the base level of satisfaction with the firm (d 0 ) increases, the optimal quality claim differential also increases.
Proof:
Proposition 6:
As average actual quality (µ) increases, the difference between optimal advertised quality and average actual quality decreases.
Proof:
Appendix 2 Instructions to Participants:
Please note that there are no right or wrong answers. Individual responses will be kept absolutely confidential and used only for statistical analysis. Please do not discuss this exercise with others -the quality of the research we do depends on your confidentiality. We will provide you with a debrief once the analysis is complete. This study will require about five minutes of your time and concerns managerial decisions about how to market a new product. We will enter each participant's name in two raffles: (i) one cash prize of $500.00 and (ii) five cash prizes of $100 each.
This study is designed to assess how managers make decisions when introducing new products. Specifically we are interested in what specific advertising claims they make about their products.
Imagine you are in charge of managing the introduction of a new line of car tires marketed under your company's existing brand. The product will be sold through standard channels, i.e., tire distributors, gas stations etc. Your job is to determine what level of quality, i.e., how long (in miles) a tire lasts, to claim for the product in its advertising and product information.
Your company tests indicate that a set of your tires will last between 28,000 miles and 52,000 miles depending on customer driving patterns and road conditions. Car tire industry research shows that customer satisfaction and repeat purchase depend, to a significant extent, on the difference between how long tires actually last and how long customers expect the tires to last prior to purchase.
What mileage would you use when describing your tires in each of the following situations:
Format for the Eight Scenarios: Your company's brand is not well known (well known). Your primary objective is to maximize first year (long-run) sales. Market research has provided the following insights:
• Customers rely mainly on company advertising (independent quality rating services (such as Consumer Reports)) rather than on independent quality rating services (such as Consumer Reports) in forming expectations about how long tires last.
• Once formed, customer expectations change only marginally (substantially) based on personal experience.
• Most customers are satisfied (not satisfied) with tires that they buy.
Mileage claim in advertising and product information: ___________________ (miles)
